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Changing perspectives on the facility siting process
Maine Policy Review. (1991) Volume 1, Number 1
by David Laws
Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and Lawrence Susskind
Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
It has become increasingly difficult to build regionally necessary but locally noxious facilities
such as power plants, landfills, waste incinerators, and prisons. The most obvious source of
difficulty is popular opposition. The opponents of such facilities are generally more effective
than their proponents. "Not-in-My-Backyard" (or NIMBY) is the typical characterization of the
such opposition, but "NIMBY" is an unfairly pejorative characterization. There are, typically,
individuals or groups who actually stand to lose more than they will gain if such facilities are
built. Their opposition may be an appropriate response to the distribution of benefits and costs, a
"closed" decision process, or poorly thought-through technical decisions. Thus the actions of
such opponents may be justified, even if the overall effect (i.e. postponing action) is undesirable
from the standpoint of the broader community.
The temptation to view NIMBY as the heart of the problem also fails to acknowledge other
difficulties typically associated with siting decisions. Indeed, if the energy and efficacy of local
resistance were to fade, siting problems would probably still not fade away. We might
(especially in the absence of local resistance) end up with the wrong types of facilities in the
wrong places, or too many facilities of a particular kind, or mismanaged facilities likely to
become a burden in the future.
Most jurisdictions have not yet figured out how to ensure a fair distribution of benefits and costs
or how to manage siting processes so that they produce wise decisions. Most are still stymied by
a fundamental lack of trust in government. Unless residents in potential "host" communities are
treated as knowledgeable individuals who can make an important contribution, and unless their
concerns are treated as legitimate, most siting processes will fail.
From our standpoint, a siting process must begin by addressing the question of need. It must then
ensure that the public has faith in the choice of technology, the selection of a site, proposed
strategies for mitigating impacts, and the proposed plans for facility operation and management.
In the pages that follow, we review these key steps in the siting process, offer a "Facility Siting
Credo" for public officials to consider, and show how its principles are being applied in practice.

A siting chronology
The question of need
New facilities must respond to real social needs. If they do not, we can probably do without
them. The link to need is the fulcrum upon which all siting processes rest. If people accept the
argument that there is a need for a facility (and they accept some of the responsibility for
responding to that need), then the siting process has a chance of succeeding. Lingering doubts
about need, or concern that the method of defining need was inadequate, will, in turn, tip the
balance the other way.
Consider a community faced with the question of what to do with its solid waste. Its desire to
build a new waste disposal facility is only partly determined by the volume of waste currently
produced. A more complete assessment of need must also take account of the likelihood of
success in future waste minimization and recycling efforts. This community will consider who
produces waste now, how much they produce, what their disposal costs are, what the costs would
be of taking no action, and how these costs would be distributed. Finally, we would want to
know the risks associated with current methods of waste disposal, and the possible shifts in the
risk burden associated with new waste disposal strategies. All of these factors must be taken into
account in assessing need.
It is not simple to analyze these alternatives because a great many uncertainties will inevitably
arise. Forecasts of future need depend on population projections, on what we estimate each
person and firm will consume, and on the quality of life standards that we specify. Needs
assessments hinge on assumptions about the ways people will spend their time in the future and
how much waste they will generate doing it. While hydrologists, chemical and civil engineers,
demographers, and others are ready to offer expert advice on such matters, it should also be
obvious that they must make judgments that will go beyond facts. Assessments of need are
unlikely to emerge from objective analysis and disinterested expertise alone.
Need forecasts also depend on judgments about birth rate, migration, and consumption patterns.
In many instances these "non-objective" judgments can swamp the outcome of any analysis.
Using a high birth rate may make sense to the person who performs the analysis, but just slight
variations in such a key operating assumption can overwhelm all other factors. Moreover,
judgments about matters such as the potential success of new recycling programs muse be
informed by "local knowledge," which is usually unavailable to outside experts.
The "Not-In-Anybody's-Backyard" movement can be seen as a criticism of the way in which
choices about need are made (Christup and Schaeffer 1990; Heiman 1990). This movement
presumes that local groups ought to block the siting of waste disposal facilities, not just to
displace construction to other locations, but because there is no underlying need for most
facilities. We should, instead, find ways of producing less (or no) waste. The pressure to do this
will be diminished if we allow new facilities to be built. The investment in new "no-waste"
production methods will be undermined if we keep providing more disposal facilities, or so this
group argues.

Finally, the issue of need is tied to growing distrust of government and popular ambivalence
about the benefits of new technology. Closed decision making and corruption have fed this
mistrust. Highly publicized accidents or technological failures (like the Challenger disaster) have
undermined what used to be unquestioned faith in technological advancement.
Choice of technology
Suppose that the parties involved in a solid waste disposal decision can reach agreement on the
scope of the problem. Such agreement might include stipulations regarding mandated reductions
in the future volume of waste, as well as targets for recycling. These will influence the waste
disposal technology that they choose. Should they expand their existing landfill, build an
incinerator, or commit to a new high-tech recycling plant?
It is, once again, tempting to treat this choice as a technical question, governed principally by
economic and engineering considerations. Given a reliable forecast of the composition and
volume of waste, likely fiscal constraints, and public health and safety standards that must be
met, analysts might be expected to select the "best" answer. But, the choice of a technology, like
the assessment of need, also rests on a great many non-objective judgments. The definition of
acceptable levels of risk and impact, the willingness of residents to accept the financial burden,
assumptions about future levels of population and economic growth, the availability of markets
for recycled materials, and other factors will influence the choice of technology. How each is
"weighted" will drastically affect this choice. The best an analyst can hope to do, is to describe
these alternatives and to spell out the tradeoffs.
Different technologies are likely to put different groups at risk. Choices about a technology,
therefore, depend on how individuals and groups judge its likely effects on them. For example,
we are likely to be more concerned about air pollution (which affects everyone) than water
pollution (which affects only those whose water supplies might be contaminated), if an
incinerator is to be built nearby. A landfill might not seem as inexpensive if we are faced with
the prospect of constant truck traffic in front of our house. Individuals and groups are likely to
attach more weight to the effects of a technology that they anticipate will affect them personally.
Site selection
The selection of a site is often tied closely to the choice of a technology. Indeed, many
characteristics of a site can only be evaluated relative to a specific technology. What we are
really asking when we try to select a site is, "How appropriate is this location for the activity we
have in mind?" This question can be framed in other ways as well. At one extreme, people are
often tempted to ask, "What is the best site?" and look to technical analysis to narrow the field to
a single choice. At another extreme, citizens can ask, "Which sites are inappropriate?" and seek
to identify areas that can be excluded on technical grounds.
Transportation access, soil capability, adjacent land uses, cost, and ownership patterns are among
the factors that often influence site selection. Some of these pertain, however, only if the site is
being considered for a particular use like a prison, a refinery, or a landfill. Depending on the
nature of the facility, specific attributes ought to come into play. A community looking to build a

solid waste disposal facility will want to consider hydrology and topography. Air circulation
patterns need to be added if incineration is the technology of choice. Depending on what exists
on the site, impacts on flora and fauna (especially endangered species) might be significant.
There is no all-purpose list of factors that must always (or exclusively) be considered in site
selection.
It is easy to continue to add factors. But, as the list becomes longer, it becomes increasingly
difficult to reach a decision. It becomes tougher to amalgamate or integrate all the various
considerations. The range of legitimate inferences that can be drawn from an increasingly
complex analysis is large. Paradoxically, we may gain a clearer understanding of the trade-offs
involved as we increase the number of factors, but we will make the final decision harder to
justify. There is no definitive way to determine the relative importance that should be attached to
each consideration. Individuals and groups are likely to have conflicting views, and no one is
correct.
There is also no generally agreed upon technique for synthesizing judgments when so many
technical and non-technical considerations are involved (Hopkins 1977; Elliot 1980). This makes
it hard to compare sites. Indeed, overall site comparisons are unlikely to be conclusive since it is
almost impossible to get agreement on how to produce a composite ranking. While it may be
tempting to try to collapse these different measures into an overall rating, such attempts are
easily undercut on basic mathematical grounds. A commitment to a single ranking of sites,
therefore, or to efforts to name the best site, is likely to lead to a faulty conclusion. At best, a site
selection process can illuminate tradeoffs.
The process of site selection is also haunted by the polarizing act of identifying suitable or
preferred sites. Once such a determination has been announced, everybody else breathes a sigh of
relief. At that point, though, the process takes on an "us versus them" quality. Siting efforts
always run the risk of becoming a contest of political will in which the participants perceive (and
not without reason) that the facility will be put in the community that offers the least resistance
or musters the fewest political resources. Such political escalation often undermines the
legitimacy of the whole siting process, since a willingness to act reasonably is often viewed as
evidence of weakness or a lack of political will.
Assessing and mitigating impacts
Impact assessment should really begin at the same time as site selection. In examining the
attributes of potential sites, impacts should be compared. Such assessments, however, tend to be
undertaken only after a "favorite" site has been selected. The assessments (required by law) are
typically ex post rationalizations for decisions that have already been made. While the law
requires that environmental impact assessments review all possible means of mitigating the
impacts that cannot be avoided, these options tend to be focused narrowly - in a way that will
cast favorable light on the site and technology favored by facility proponents. (See, for example,
Susskind 1978 and Borzok 1986.)
In an impact assessment, we want to compare site-technology combinations with each other. For
all the reasons we have already discussed, however, such comparisons are often spurious.

Substantial uncertainties cloud such forecasts, and at best, we can offer probabilistic statements
(e.g., there is a sixty percent chance that water quality measured in a certain way is likely to
deteriorate). The models available for making such forecasts are often based on data and
assumptions for one time and location that are not easily recalibrated. At the very least, such
"refitting" of these models is very expensive and time consuming.
We must also compare (because the law requires it) possible courses of action with what will
happen if nothing is done (i.e., the "no-build" option.) Since neither the site nor the need will
remain static, it does not make sense to use the status quo as the basis for a no-build comparison.
Yet, if we try to extrapolate from the present, we encounter the "moving baseline" problem. Not
only are we uncertain about what the impacts of various contemplated actions are likely to be,
but we are unclear about what will happen if the proposed project is not built. Something else is
likely to occur. But what? In sum, impact assessment can give us a richer and more detailed
understanding of the trade-offs we face, but it is unlikely to provide a definitive basis for
choosing a course of action. Non-objective judgments must come into play. And these can often
overwhelm the contribution of purely technical (or expert) analysis.
Another concern is how to think about mitigation. Is compensation an acceptable form of
mitigation? If there is a risk that a new landfill might contaminate groundwater, we can require
that it be constructed with a liner, that leachate be collected and treated, that groundwater be
monitored, and - if contamination occurs - that groundwater be pumped and treated (Zeiss 1991).
But, is it legitimate to introduce compensation as a form of mitigation if impacts cannot be
avoided? This can include guaranteeing the resale value of houses, providing alternative sources
of service if drinking water has become polluted, or promising to construct a new wetland of
equivalent size if an old wetland is inadvertently damaged. Such compensatory measures do have
the effect of offsetting potential damages, but are they equivalent to mitigation measures that
seek to reduce or avoid impacts all together?
There is no clear way, in our view, to judge the equivalence of such compensatory steps.
Wetlands, for instance, are incredibly complicated and their internal functioning as well as their
role in the larger ecosystem are not fully understood. Thus, the promise to build an artificial
wetland cannot guarantee that all ecological functions will be sustained. In light of such
uncertainties, it is difficult to make judgments about the appropriateness or sufficiency of
compensation.
Management
Decisions about the acceptability of impact mitigation and compensation are often a function of
the perceptions that interest groups have about how a facility is likely to be operated and
managed. If a host community does not trust the government or a private company to do the right
thing (or even what they promised), it may set much more exacting impact mitigation and
compensation requirements. Thus, attitudes toward the acceptability of certain emission controls
are shaped by confidence in the facility operator. A host community might well be concerned
about how operating standards and management practices will be revised as new information and
technology become available. Indeed, will the knowledge gained through operation of the facility
be used to ensure improved performance?

Distrust will often be expressed through resistance at the earliest stages of the siting process. It
must be acknowledged and addressed at every step, especially in the specification of
management practices and organizational arrangements. Until it is, siting is likely to be blocked.
Summary
At each stage in the siting process there are choices, and there are numerous considerations.
Throughout the siting process, there is an important role for technical analysis and expert
judgment, but these cannot be definitive. Uncertainty, non-objective judgments, a lack of
agreement on priorities, and an inability to make conclusive comparisons must all be
acknowledged.

Approaches to the siting problem
In practice, new facilities are usually proposed by government agencies, although private
corporations are often the prime movers behind such efforts. The staffs of these organizations
must respond to internal (i.e., political or institutional) pressures that create time and cost
limitations. If agency and corporate staff are adept, they will realize that they must operate in a
political context which limits what they can do. The most common response to such constraints
is to adopt a "decide-announce-defend" strategy (Duscik 1978; O'Hare et al. 1983).
The agency relies on a small set or professionals with pertinent expertise. This group draws
heavily on current ideas about best practice, responds to current legal requirements (like health
and safety regulations), and tries to take account of "political realities." They often provide no
opportunity for public comment prior to deciding what they think ought to be done. Opening up
the decision process before the experts have announced their proposed strategy is tantamount, in
the eyes of many elected and appointed officials, to admitting that political considerations are
more important than technical factors. This is viewed as an unwise admission (even if it is true!).
Once the agency and its experts (in consultation with industry) reach a decision about a site and a
technology, they may well allow hearings or some other occasions for groups that are unhappy to
"sound off." Proposals are typically presented as the technically best way of meeting a need or
responding to a crisis (i.e., an incinerator for Bloomsbury, or a landfill for Brownton.) Once the
announcement has been made, agency personnel shift into a defensive mode. Thereafter,
interactions with angry or dissatisfied groups are likely to be characterized by legalistic
exchanges as everyone prepares for the eventuality of a lawsuit.
The proponents of a new facility usually have tried to act responsibly. Indeed, they may be
angered or personally offended by protests claiming that they behaved inappropriately. They
may wonder why the host community, or "the best location," is unwilling to accept the agency's
technical justification, or why residents won't accept their social responsibility. "NIMBY" offers
a "sore loser" explanation for resistance that is consistent with such perceptions. "NIMBY" also
suggests that the proponents must stand firmly behind their decisions, deflect all criticism using
the shield of "objective" analysis, and hope that others in positions of authority will rally around.

As our review of the siting process has shown, however, most siting decisions are impossible to
justify on technical grounds alone. At each stage, from the determination of need, through the
selection of a technology and a site, to the specification of impact mitigation strategies and
management practices, many non-objective judgments can and should come into play. The key is
to acknowledge this and involve representatives of all "stakeholding groups" in open discussions
about these tradeoffs.
It is not difficult to see why a community selected as a host site is likely to fight back. Invariably
the costs to those residents outweigh the benefits that they will personally derive from the
facility, even if the benefits to the state or region far outweigh these costs. This is especially true
if a host community already provides a location for other locally noxious facilities. Why should
one community bear such disproportionate burdens? Fairness, more than the adequacy of
technical judgments, may be at the core of their complaints. If legitimate differences in
perspective have been dismissed without public discussion, if questions about acceptable levels
of risk were not addressed, if judgments about the validity or appropriateness of information and
modeling assumptions could not be called into question, it is no wonder that host communities
gain support when they claim that they have been treated unfairly. While it may seem strange
(and irrational) to the proponents, a majority of prospective beneficiaries often side with
opponents in blocking a new facility. This occurs, especially, when claims of unfairness ring
true.
An alternative approach to facility siting
It is possible to make siting decisions that reflect and respond to the concerns of potential host
communities. This can be accomplished without compromising the technical input into these
decisions or the authority of those with statutory mandates to take action.
The "Facility Siting Credo" outlined below offers what we think is the best possible advice.1 It
was distilled from the experience of dozens of siting experts and practitioners who participated in
the 1989-90 National Workshop on Facility Siting sponsored by MIT and the University of
Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business. The elements of the Credo must be adopted as a
package to realize the benefits that this approach offers.
1. Seek consensus - It is important to seek the active involvement of all groups who may be
affected by a siting decision. Active participation is the appropriate antidote to uncertainty,
ambiguity, and legitimate differences of opinion. Representatives of stakeholding groups should
participate in determining need, developing criteria for selecting a technology and a site,
assessing impacts and developing mitigation strategies, determining satisfactory compensation
when impacts cannot be avoided, and specifying monitoring agreements and other management
practices. They should be consulted before key decisions are made.
The technical aspects of siting can be treated as occasions for joint inquiry, involving experts
acceptable to representatives of all stakeholding groups (including the agencies responsible for
making the siting decisions.) In a consensus-building process, expertise should be augmented by
local knowledge, and subjected to vigorous public debate. Differences can be addressed by
searching for new ways of framing questions or different ways of packaging trade-offs.

A facility siting process that provides opportunities for participation and seeks consensus is
likely to blunt charges of unfairness. While parties that actively participate may not become
advocates of a final siting decision, an open process enhances credibility and legitimacy. This
can help avoid subsequent legal and political challenges.
Any consensus must also reflect the substantive concerns of the parties who have the
responsibility for making a decision. Indeed, they should have the equivalent of a veto power. It
is possible, though, for decision-makers to meet all their statutory requirements as well as the
interests of all affected parties.
The burden of running a consensus-building process may be too much for an agency with other
responsibilities. Indeed, the management of consensus-building requires skills and experience
that key actors often lack. Moreover, stakeholders may be suspicious of a process run by a
proponent. Responsible agencies may, therefore, need to seek the help of a mediator or facilitator
to manage a consensus-building process. A neutral professional can help to guarantee that a
process will be perceived as fair. Neutrals should also have the skills to handle disruptions along
the way.
2. Work to develop trust - Lack of trust is perhaps the major barrier to reaching consensus. A
major source of mistrust is the assumption that affected communities must accept siting
decisions if the technical justification is sufficient and procedural requirements have been met.
Ambiguity over benefits and risks will give rise to doubts regardless of the weight of the
technical evidence. A failure to acknowledge these ambiguities leads to mistrust. Locating
multiple facilities in poor or otherwise disadvantaged areas (regardless of the compensation
required or the openness of the process) is another source of mistrust.
Building trust is hard because it must be approached indirectly. Trust is basically a by-product of
action that is viewed as trustworthy. Being open about the difficulties of decision making and
acknowledging past mistakes can help to rebuild trust. Attempts to hide problems, conceal
uncertainties, or ignore the legitimate concerns of opponents will further undermine trust.
3. Set realistic timetables - Building consensus takes time. The time commitments involved,
however, should be compared to realistic assessments of the time involved in fighting legal and
political battles when consensus is not reached. Attempts to rush consensus building are likely to
be unsuccessful in the long-run, and to undermine trust in the short-run. On the other hand, siting
processes need to be constrained by realistic deadlines or the parties involved will have no way
of gauging progress or allocating adequate resources to cover the costs of participation.
Deadlines should be sufficient for careful deliberation, but they should require that key decisions
be made at specified intervals so that no one can use the consensus building process as a barrier
to action.
Several points in the Credo respond to specific difficulties that arise at key steps in the siting
process:
4. Get agreement that the status quo is unacceptable - A siting process must begin with
agreement that a facility is needed. Need must be clearly defined and widely understood. The

implications of doing nothing must be spelled out. The sponsors or proponents of a facility
should be able to specify who the beneficiaries will be. If a problem is not considered important,
or the status quo is deemed acceptable by many interest groups, it is unlikely that the need for a
facility will be established. A siting process that proceeds without agreement on need is unlikely
to succeed.
5. Choose the design that best addresses the problem - The difficulties of selecting a technology
and a site should be addressed through a review of many possible alternatives. The long- and
short-term implications of each alternative (including doing nothing) should be analyzed
carefully. Since it unlikely that an indisputably "best" option will emerge, no matter how much
technical analysis is done, "best" should be judged relative to the extent to which the interests of
all stakeholders are likely to be met. Multiple views of the problem need to be given weight.
6. Guarantee that stringent safety standards will be met - No community should be asked to
compromise its basic health or safety so that a facility can be built. At a minimum, this means
that all new facilities must meet federal and state standards and reflect current thinking about
"best practice." Health and safety guarantees cannot be traded away for guarantees of financial or
other types of compensation. Acceptable levels of risk should be specified by the stakeholders in
light of joint investigations of the risks associated with alternative technologies and possible
strategies for minimizing risk. Related risks that are currently accepted by a community, as well
as the risks associated with no action, should also be considered. Health and safety cannot be
guaranteed unless agreements are made about how on-going monitoring will be handled and
what steps will be taken if agreed-upon standards are not met (i.e., "shutdown" provisions.) Host
communities should be provided with whatever resources they need to participate in monitoring
procedures and in interpreting monitoring results.
7. Fully compensate all negative impacts of a facility - When impacts cannot be prevented or
mitigated to the satisfaction of the affected parties, various forms of compensation - specified by
the stakeholders involved - should be negotiated. Compensation agreements may include
property value guarantees, creation of equivalent habitats when loss is unavoidable, and the
guarantee of service (such as a water supplies) if contamination occurs. Compensation
agreements should specify the conditions under which action will be taken and provide schedules
that describe who is to do what (or pay what) by when. Again, compensation should only be used
in relation to impacts over and above minimum health and safety standards specified by law.
8. Use contingent agreements - Some concerns about the management of facilities can be
resolved by contingent agreements that specify what will be done in case of accidents,
interruptions of service, changes in standards, or the emergence of new scientific information
about risks or impacts. Such agreements should specify the conditions under which the facility
must be shut down temporarily or permanently. They should also describe the triggers for action,
define responsibilities for taking action, and provide means of guaranteeing that contingent
promises will be met. This can be accomplished through the use of "self-fulfilling contracts"
(like liquidating bonds) or the use of permits that have to be renewed periodically in light of
performance.

Finally, several points in the Credo relate to fairness:
9. Keep multiple, options on the table at all times - Host communities sometimes feel stigmatized
or discriminated against, particularly if they are the only site being considered. This is true
regardless of the thoroughness of the technical analysis that led to the ranking of communities.
Conversely, the sponsors of a facility may feel they are being held hostage by a host community
in negotiations over compensation or benefit packages if only one community is under
consideration. Both problems can be avoided by keeping multiple options open until the very end
of a siring process. Parties on both sides are less likely to be suspicious, discussions are less
likely to degenerate into confrontations, and the acceptability of the eventual outcome will be
enhanced if multiple options remain open. This may seem unduly costly both in political and
financial terms, but the costs are likely to be less than those associated with picking one best site
and then having to retreat to a second best alternative if the first one does not work out.
10. Make the host community better off - If facilities respond to real needs, the magnitude of
benefits should be large enough for transfer payments to be made by the region to the host
community (Raiffa 1985). A comprehensive package of benefits can include anything from
reducing risks unrelated to the new facility, to tax reductions, to amenities such as parks, or even
direct cash payments to selected residents or areas. The net effect should be that the community
feels it is better off because it has accepted a facility. Incentive payments or promises to take
actions of various kinds should be made over and above commitments to mitigate impacts or
compensate a community for impacts that cannot be mitigated.
11. Seek acceptable sites through a volunteer process - If people understand the need for a
facility, and the risks associated with it, if health and safety standards will be met and adverse
impacts mitigated or compensated, and if sufficient additional benefits are provided, it may be
that communities will compete to host a facility. The chance of finding volunteer communities
will be enhanced if an expression of interest in hosting a facility is not viewed as a tacit
admission that the attendant risks are acceptable. Such expressions of interest should be viewed
as invitations to negotiate, not as commitments. While fairness is difficult to specify objectively,
consent provides at least one indicator of perceived fairness. So, it would be best to find a
volunteer site from among those that are technically acceptable.
12. Consider a competitive siting process - If the level of benefits seems high enough to potential
volunteers, they will compete to host a facility. Communities currently compete for new
industrial development that creates various adverse impacts but brings in desirable tax revenues.
It may be possible to engender a similar competition for regionally necessary but locally noxious
facilities. A competitive process must ensure that the level of benefits to a host community is
reasonable; the competitive or bidding process should not be used to reduce benefits to a level
below that required to compensate for all non-mitigatable impacts.
13. Work for geographic fairness - Compensation and incentive payments cannot address all
concerns about fairness, even if a community volunteers to host a facility. In addition to a fair
distribution of costs and benefits associated with a new facility, there are concerns about crossfacility equity or geographic fairness that ought not be overlooked. No single community or
neighborhood should be the site for many noxious facilities. Geographic fairness can be

addressed through a point system for siting different types of locally unwanted land uses
(LULUs) or through a preference for smaller, multiple facilities of the same kind, rather than a
single centralized facility. Geographic fairness may not emerge as an issue every time a facility
is sited, but at some point a threshold will be crossed, and it will have to be addressed.
What guarantees does a consensus building approach offer?
Decisions produced through a consensus-building approach that takes account of the thirteen
elements in the Credo may also be questioned. However, if stakeholding groups are given an
opportunity to participate in decision making, if their representatives are accountable to the
groups they are supposed to represent, if the representatives are provided with the information
and assistance they need, if the dialogue is understandable and if ground rules that guarantee
equal airing of views are enforced, a siting process is more likely to be accepted as fair.
If stakeholding groups are able to reach consensus on an assessment of need, a choice of (or
means of choosing) a technology and site, an assessment of impacts and mitigation measures,
and procedures for operating and monitoring a facility, then they are less likely to sue and less
likely to win popular support if they do. If a siting agreement reflects the diversity and intensity
of concerns and is acceptable to all the affected parties that took the opportunity to participate in
the dialogue, public perceptions of fairness are likely to be enhanced.
But are siting decisions reached by consensus likely to be wise? The cultivation of diverse
perspectives does more than ensure that proposals are responsive to different groups. It seeks to
incorporate the widest possible range of local knowledge and experience into decision making.
Consensus-building seeks to ensure that all types of knowledge and experience are applied
appropriately when assumptions and judgments must be made. In the face of uncertainty and the
lack of a definitive basis for decision making, consensus building assumes that vigorous and
extended debate is the source of wisdom.
The wisdom of a siting decision may also be judged relative to the learning that it reflects.
Herbert Simon (1981, p. 151) makes the point quite clearly:
"We have usually thought of ... planning as a means whereby the planner's creativity could build
a system chat would satisfy the needs of a populace. Perhaps we should think of planning as a
valuable creative activity in which many members of a community can have the opportunity of
participating - if we have the wits to organize the process that way."
If a broad-based dialogue can be sustained, consensus building offers multiple opportunities for
learning. Technical consultants and managers need firsthand exposure to public concerns and the
benefit of local knowledge, expertise, and on-the-ground experience. Moreover, presenting
technical analysis in understandable terms can enhance clarity of thinking. Members of the
public are likely to gain a deeper understanding of the issues involved and the choices that must
be made if they participate in on-going dialogue.
Discovery is also possible. Discussion among people with diverse experiences and background
can lead to new insights, a re-evaluation of priorities, and new relationships. If facilities are

viewed as adaptive responses to problems whose definition and dimensions are always changing,
the value of learning is clear. A deeper and broader understanding of the problem and the choices
involved may also be invaluable in monitoring a facility over time, and in recognizing related
problems in the future. Moreover, when consensus building is successful, it leaves the
participants with a clearer sense of how they might respond to problems and disagreements in the
future.
Can this approach work in practice?
We can illustrate how the principles contained in the Credo have been applied in practice:
Formulating a city wide policy on LULUs - Like most communities, Jacksonville, Florida
(population 700,000) could not get necessary, but locally noxious, facilities sited. The city had
been trying to site a new landfill and a resource recovery plant, expand an expressway, build
housing for low income and homeless families, and construct residential facilities for
developmentally disabled adults, recovering addicts, and AIDS victims. The need for some of
these facilities had become critical. Failure to site a new landfill, for instance, had forced the city
to spend at least $55 million to ship its trash out of state.
Frustrated by the resistance to each proposed facility, city officials decided that a new approach
was needed. First they met with the Chamber of Commerce and the Community Council (a
private, non-profit organization of respected leaders) to propose a collaborative effort to develop
a city-wide policy on siting LULUs. These groups agreed to help organize a city-wide effort.
The sponsors decided on a one day, town meeting style event as a forum for developing the
LULU policy. The morning session was open to the press and public and was devoted to
presentations on the scope of the siting problem and the need for various facilities. The afternoon
was limited to official representatives invited by the mayor and the city council. These delegates,
with the assistance of trained facilitators, worked, first in small groups and then in a plenary
session, to draft a set of principles that they could adopt by consensus and present to the city
council.
The delegates invited to the meeting included representatives of each neighborhood as well as
environmental organizations, key staff members from city and county agencies, religious leaders,
nominees of the business community, and representatives of several "good government" groups.
An effort was made to include equal representation of proponents and opponents of the various
facilities that the city had already proposed. The gender, ethnic, and racial distribution of the
delegates was considered, but these factors were seen as secondary.
Most of the invited delegates chose to attend. The meeting was held, but not without incident.
Representatives of the local Rainbow Coalition protested outside the meeting that only two
African-American groups and one Hispanic group had been invited. A member of the city
council and a number of city department heads expressed concerns about the use of such a group
for ad hoc policy-making.

Nevertheless, the delegates reached agreement on a set of principles to guide facility siting in the
city. These principles included a recommendation that face to face negotiations between
stakeholders be used at all times. The delegates suggested that this process should:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Begin as early as possible and give consideration to multiple sites;
Use neutral facilitators or conveners where appropriate;
Engage all stakeholders and ensure that representation is truly grassroots;
Get agreement on fact-finding methods, including methods for assessing need;
Search for options that emphasize mutual gain and that include providing compensation
to affected neighborhoods;
Consider the reasonableness of concentrating LULUs in certain neighborhoods;
Codify all understandings in a written agreement that is contractually binding;
Make provisions for independent monitoring, and self-enforcing agreements.

The delegates agreed that the new siting process should augment (rather than circumvent)
formal, legal decision-making processes, and should be used to provide elected and appointed
officials with the best possible advice.
The mayor proclaimed the conference a success and most delegates left feeling enthusiastic. The
city council endorsed the siting principles; the role of public involvement in developing a citywide policy on siting LULUs was applauded by the local press. The city's Department of
Transportation made progress on its expressway expansion proposal by acknowledging that they
would abide by the siting principles. Staff of several city agencies, however, complained that
multiple sitings in the same neighborhood should not be ruled out if technically sound sites were
available. The use of compensation was labeled bribery by several members of the chamber of
commerce (which refused to formally endorse the LULU policy).
Siting a low level radioactive waste disposal facility - In 1987, Maine passed a Low Level
Radioactive Waste (LLRW) Disposal Act in response to federal legislation requiring states to
provide a means of disposing of all low level radioactive waste. The state legislature created the
Maine Low Level Radioactive Waste Authority, a gubernatorially-appointed body of seven
people, and gave it the responsibility for siting, licensing, constructing, and operating a LLRW
disposal facility. Maine presently ships its waste out of state, but this arrangement is likely to end
soon. State officials know that Maine faces the prospect of assuming responsibility for all the
LLRW it generates and paying stiff fines if it cannot find a long term waste disposal solution by
1993. The governor's office is investigating the possibility of entering into a disposal compact
with Texas, but this is a complicated procedure that depends on a great many factors beyond the
state's control.
Maine has discretion under the federal legislation to define site suitability requirements above
and beyond those mandated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A variety of disposal and
storage technologies are possible, but there is disagreement about the risks associated with them.
The Maine disposal act places an added requirement on the Low Level Radioactive Waste
Authority - sixty percent of the voters in a community selected to host a facility must approve the
siting decision.

The authority has hired a full-time staff and several nationally recognized consultants.
Consulting engineers are completing a state-wide site screening effort aimed at identifying
technically appropriate sites. A firm that offers mediation and facilitation services has been hired
to assist in the process of building a state-wide consensus on criteria for site selection and the
design of the disposal facility. This firm is assisting a Citizens Advisory Group (CAG) in its
attempt to advise the authority on how best to meet the interests and concerns of all affected
parties. Every effort has been made to include all stakeholding interests in the work of the CAG.
More than eighty-five groups and individuals have indicated a desire to participate. Members
include a cross-section of environmental organizations, waste generators, business groups,
governmental agencies, political interest groups, and concerned citizens, as well as members and
staff of the authority. The CAG has adopted protocols to ensure that all views in this diverse
group are heard.
Some of the individuals invited to join the CAG faced a difficult choice. The issues involved in
LLRW disposal are highly technical and no scientific consensus exists on many of them. The
CAG itself was criticized, almost immediately, by anti-nuclear groups for including too many
government officials and too many waste generators, and for not giving anti-nuclear views a fair
hearing. Charges were also made that participation in the CAG might legitimize the continued
production of radioactive waste and constitute an endorsement of the continued use of nuclear
power in Maine. More-over, the CAG is only an advisory board and there is no guarantee that
any of its recommendations will be followed by the authority. On other hand, several referenda
aimed at closing the state's nuclear power plant have failed, and, even without an active power
plant, Maine will still face the task of disposing of its low level nuclear waste.
Those who joined the CAG faced several difficult tasks. They were asked by the authority for
specific advice on (1) developing technical criteria for eliminating inappropriate sites, (2)
ranking qualified sites and suggesting guidelines for negotiating compensation agreements with
potential host communities, (3) scoping the environmental assessments that must be done for
"finalist" sites, (4) formulating mitigation and joint management proposals, and ( 5) strategies for
involving the public throughout the siting process. They have reviewed all siting criteria
proposed by the engineering consultants, and suggested choices that have been adopted by the
authority. They have helped to design a "volunteer process" for sites.
The authority has purchased options on at lease ten sites volunteered in various locations. By
early 1992, the authority hopes to have a very short list of candidate sites. It must then conduct
detailed "site characterization" studies and secure a sixty percent favorable vote in one of these
communities, as well as majority support in the state legislature. Thus far, the CAG has played a
key role at every step in the siting process. Whether this will make it easier to gain the necessary
support later remains to be seen. Whether the reliance on a volunteer process will produce an
acceptable site more readily than in states that have selected "technically best" sites and
threatened to pre-empt local decision making also remains to be seen. Finally, it is too soon to
tell whether the authority's willingness to offer compensatory and incentive payments will be
seen as guaranteeing greater fairness.

Conclusions
These cases do not prove that the approach to facility siting described in the Credo will succeed.
They do show, though, that these concepts can be applied in practice. In both Jacksonville and
Maine, diverse groups have come close to agreeing on general facility-siting principles.
The composition of both the Jacksonville and Maine groups was challenged. It may be
impossible to avoid such challenges altogether. Every effort must be made to elicit the widest
possible participation of stake-holding groups-even if this means actively reaching out to assist
groups that might not be aware that they have a stake in siting decisions or do not feel that they
have the capacity to participate.
Offers to compensate unmitigated risks are also likely to be a source of contention. It is
important to frame compensation as "benefit sharing" (between the wider community of
beneficiaries and the host community.) Charges of bribery are inappropriate and can be deflected
by ensuring that the siting process is open, that all health and safety standards established by law
must be met, and that any compensation or incentive payments benefit everyone in a host
community, not just a few individuals. Bribes are secret payments made under the table to a few
beneficiaries. Thus compensation is clearly not bribery.
Facility siting is difficult. The opportunities for disagreement are so large that the infrequent
success we currently achieve is probably all we can hope for, especially until faith in government
is restored. The guidelines in the Credo assume that individuals and groups likely to be affected
by siting decisions have legitimate concerns and valuable knowledge, and ought to be consulted.
The Credo provides a framework for including these stakeholders in deciding on fair
distributions of costs and benefits and in making decisions that will be perceived as wise. While
the Credo does not guarantee success, we urge public officials and policymakers to consider
formally endorsing these principles.
Laurence Susskind is a Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning at MIT and Director of
the MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program. Professor Susskind is also manager of Public
Dispute Resolution Services for Endispute Incorporated, in which capacity he has served as the
facilitator for the Citizens' Advisory Group created by the Maine Low Level Radioactive Waste
Authority.
David Laws is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at MIT.
He was a research assistant for the National Workshop on Facility Siting.
End Notes
1. We are indebted to our colleagues Howard Kunreuther, Professor of Decision Sciences at
the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business and Director of the
Wharton Risk and Decision Processes Center, and Tom Aarts, a doctoral candidate at the
Wharton School, for their continued collaboration in developing and promulgating the
Credo. A simplified version of this "Credo" appears in Susskind (1990).
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